Category: Windows Server/Client


Reference articles to secure a Windows domain:

https://github.com/PaulSec/awesome-windows-domain-hardening

Microsoft audit Policy settings and recommendations:

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/identity/ad-ds/plan/security-best-practices/audit-policy-recommendations

Sysinternals sysmon:

https://onedrive.live.com/view.aspx?resid=D026B4699190F1E6!2843&ithint=file%2cpptx&app=PowerPoint&authkey=!AMvCRTKB_V1J5ow

On ADsecurity.org:

Beyond domain admins: https://adsecurity.org/?p=3700

Gathering AD data with PowerShell: https://adsecurity.org/?p=3719

Hardening Windows computers, secure Baseline check list: https://adsecurity.org/?p=3299

Hardening Windows domain, secure Baseline check list:

Securing Domain Controllers to Improve Active Directory Security

Domain hardening in general:

  • Implement 2 or 3 tier model against Pass the Hash threat
  • FGPP implementation
  • LAPS Implementation
  • Process for proper cleanup of unused AD accounts
  • Reset of krbtgt account,domain admins account,IT administrators account
  • Setting Up Jump servers for Tier0,1,2 users
  • Domain joining of all windows boxes
  • Proper account Management Based on privileges
  • Usage of service accounts to run application instead of local system accounts
  • Review of existing AD accounts/Deletion of Unnecessary Accounts/ Review Ou structuring/GPO etc
  • HoneyToken Account Creation in Local boxes as well domain
  • GPO changes for disabling guest accounts across system,restricted RDP mode,Password Policy changes,disabling internet in member servers
  • GPO for Jump server implementation based on PAW GPO settings
  • Rename existing builtin Administrator account and lockdown
  • Sysmon deployment and WEF setup (WEC for symon events)
  • Use Pingcastle www.pingcastle.com  review to assess the AD security
  • Use Bloodhound (https://github.com/BloodHoundAD/BloodHound) to assess the AD security
  • Use ADTimeline to assess the AD security

 

Some interesting sites:

Windows hardening: https://wp.me/p15Zft-Mr

Privilege admin workstation: https://wp.me/p15Zft-Mr

Delegate WMI access to domain controllers:

This post originally came about after several customers asked how to remove users accounts from Domain Admins and the Administrators group in the domain. These accounts are needed to monitor the systems, so we needed to find a way to get them to read the instrumentation of the system with non-elevated privilege.

https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/askpfeplat/2018/04/30/delegate-wmi-access-to-domain-controllers/

 

I got request form IT Security team to block DNS query malware in DNS Service.

They guide me with follow this link.

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/networking/dns/deploy/apply-filters-on-dns-queries 

ex: Add-DnsServerQueryResolutionPolicy -Name “BlockListPolicy” -Action IGNORE -FQDN “EQ,*.onion” -PassThru

Unfortunately, this PowerShell command works only Windows server 2016 or greater.

For previous versions read those articles:

https://superuser.com/questions/458590/how-to-setup-a-dns-blacklist-whitelist-on-windows-server-2008-r2

https://serverfault.com/questions/513777/prevent-dns-responses-for-specific-domain-completely

third-party DNS firewall:

https://softati.com/download/dns-firewall/

 

 

DFIR ORC, where ORC stands for “Outil de Recherche de Compromission” in French, is a collection of specialized tools dedicated to reliably parse and collect critical artefacts such as the MFT, registry hives or event logs. It can also embed external tools and their configurations.

DFIR ORC collects data, but does not analyze it: it is not meant to triage machines. It cannot spy on an attacker either, as an EDR or HIDS/HIPS would. It rather provides a forensically relevant snapshot of machines running Microsoft Windows.

Links:

https://dfir-orc.github.io/

https://github.com/DFIR-ORC/dfir-orc

 

How to clear credential manager entries:

https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/rmilne/2019/01/11/script-to-clear-credman/

 

 

Windows 10 powertoys

https://www.theverge.com/2019/9/6/20852451/microsoft-windows-10-powertoys-download-features

 

 

Reference article:

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/previous-versions/windows/it-pro/windows-server-2008-R2-and-2008/hh994558(v=ws.10)

 

 

Reference:

Need 2012 R2 Domain functional level on the forest to use authentication silos/policies

Their are part of the configuration partition (so, at the forest level), replicated on all domain controllers

 

https://github.com/MicrosoftDocs/windowsserverdocs/blob/master/WindowsServerDocs/security/credentials-protection-and-management/authentication-policies-and-authentication-policy-silos.md

 

https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/windows-server/security/credentials-protection-and-management/authentication-policies-and-authentication-policy-silos#BKMK_HowKerbUsed

 

Videos:

There’s Something About Service Accounts

 

 

Full article:

https://401trg.com/an-introduction-to-smb-for-network-security-analysts/

 

Introduction:

At its most basic, SMB is a protocol to allow devices to perform a number of functions on each other over a (usually local) network. SMB has been around for so long and maintains so much backwards compatibility that it contains an almost absurd amount of vestigial functionality, but its modern core use is simpler than it seems. For the most part, today SMB is used to map network drives, send data to printers, read and write remote files, perform remote administration, and access services on remote machines.

SMB runs directly over TCP (port 445) or over NetBIOS (usually port 139, rarely port 137 or 138). To begin an SMB session, the two participants agree on a dialect, authentication is performed, and the initiator connects to a ‘tree.’ For most intents and purposes, the tree can be thought of as a network share.[1] The PCAP below, shown in Wireshark, demonstrates a simple session setup and tree connect. In this case, the machine 192.168.10.31 is connecting to the “c$” share (equivalent to the C:\ drive) on the 192.168.10.30 machine, which is called “admin-pc

 

When you connect to remote Server Message Block (SMB) services shares by using \\192.x.y.z\share name, Kerberos is not used, and the Internet Protocol (IP) SMB file share access does not use Kerberos. A network trace shows the following Kerberos error in the KRB_ERROR: Server not found in Kerberos database

Cause:

By default, Microsoft Windows Server 2003 and Microsoft Windows 2000 try to use Kerberos as the security provider. When a client uses Kerberos to authenticate itself to a server, the client requests a session ticket for the Service Principal Name (SPN). IP addresses are not names, so Kerberos is not used. After this occurs, the server goes through the list of the other supported security providers.

Status:

This behavior is by design.
IP addresses typically change, and it is not workable to add these addresses as SPNs. An SPN can be one of the following:

•The DNS name for the domain.
•The DNS name of a host.
•The distinguished name of a service connection point object.